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                UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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EDWARD BANKS, et al.,
EDWARD BANKS, et al., ) Civil Action
Plaintiffs,
vs.
QUINCY L. BOOTH, et al., Washington, DC
April 7, 2020
Defendants. ) 10:04 a.m.
(MORNING SESSION)


## TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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THE COURT: This is Banks, et al., versus Booth, et al., 20-CV-849.

So I'll turn to the way we're going to be proceeding. I have some questions that I'm going to direct to Plaintiffs' counsel and to defense counsel. I'll allow a response from opposing counsel for whatever their answers are and a reply if it's appropriate if they bring up something new. Don't just repeat what you already said on first time.

The seriousness of the pandemic and the fact that it's highly contagious is a given. So we don't really need to get into a great deal of information relating to that other than information that would go to what the conditions are. But those are certainly a given.

And I understand that as of this morning that 20 have tested positive at CDF, the central detention facility, as well. And there are also a number of tests that I understand that are pending.

If you -- those on the video and -- I'm sorry. I couldn't get everybody on the video. But if you want to refer to an answer either from the beginning of my question or after you answer part of it, if you want someone else to supplement it, simply give the person's name, and that person can then provide the rest of the answer.

At the end, I'll allow each side to make any
additional points that you want to. But what I've tried to do is to focus on some issues in your pleadings that I thought we should raise as a discussion.

So I've reviewed the Plaintiffs' complaint, the motion for the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction and all the attachments. I've also read the pleadings of the Defendants' response to the Plaintiffs' motion and all of their attachments, which are -- the attachments and all of those motions are fairly substantial.

My questions are going to be predominantly around legal issues. They will obviously include potentially some fact issues. But $I$ will discuss some factual issues at the end in terms of the conditions.

And as part of the discussion, I'm also going to be bringing up -- I have some somewhat recent information from DC Superior Court. If I make mistakes in presenting their information, I'm sure at a later point they'll correct it.

So at this point, as I understand it, for Plaintiffs first, we have Steven Marcus and Jonathan Anderson. And as speakers for the Defendants, we have Micah Bluming. So then let me go ahead and start with the questions.

> I'm going to start with some questions for the

Plaintiffs. In the pleading, the Defendants identified what they viewed as certain constraints on the Department of Corrections. And by that, $I$ mean there's a national shortage of PPE, budgetary constraints and other kinds of identification. So do those constraints at the Department of Corrections and the steps taken in spite of those constraints preclude a finding of deliberate indifference? And why are the steps that they've taken to date insufficient?

I realize there's a dispute about whether they've implemented it; but let's look at it in the context of the steps they've indicated that they have taken. And there obviously is a distinction between pretrial in the standards and post-trial, but I'll get to that a little bit later.

So, Plaintiffs, do the constraints on the Department of Corrections and the steps they've taken in spite of those constraints preclude a finding of deliberate indifference? And the steps they've taken, assuming they have done them, are they to date? Are they insufficient? So whoever wants to answer from the Plaintiffs.

MR. MARCUS: Thank you, your Honor. Steven Marcus for the Plaintiffs.

A couple of points. And I'll start on the facts before moving to the law.

The only factual constraint identified in the
record by Defendants is the lack of hand sanitizer that comes from the Lennard Johnson declaration. At Paragraph 10 of the Johnson declaration, he says the Department of Corrections lacks a sufficient supply of hand sanitizer to make it available to every resident.

Warden Johnson does not mention a lack of personal protective equipment, nor does Dr. Jordan mention a lack of personal protective equipment. The only evidence in the record is about hand sanitizer.

And when you take a closer look at the exhibits submitted by Defendants, the COVID-19 supply list, which is intended to be attached to Mr. Johnson's submission but is attached at Docket No. 25-2, it rebuts Warden Johnson's claim that there's a lack of hand sanitizer. That shows that the Department of Corrections currently has 864 bottles of hand sanitizer currently in stock as of March 24 th, and they expect an additional 864 bottles to be delivered on April 15th. That supply would ultimately include 80 cases of Purell hand sanitizer of asserted stocks. So the only constraint identified by Defendants is actually shown not to be a constraint in fact only.

I also want to mention that our argument about the deliberate indifference of Defendants goes far beyond the provision of supplies like hand sanitizer and soap or personal protective equipment.

THE COURT: I understand that. I'm going to get to the discussion about the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment and deliberate indifference a little later. If we could just focus on this for a second.

Now, I assume that you, Mr. Marcus, and Plaintiffs' counsel looked at this, because they did -- I'm not sure whether -- I've been getting them, so I'm not sure where it came from, because $I$ got this from the Center report. It may have come from Eric Glover or I may have gotten it, frankly, from the attachments. But there is a DC Department of Corrections COVID-19 response FAQs, which sets out questions and indicates different answers which talks about what they're supplying, what they're doing, et cetera, in terms of doing it.

Have you seen that document, Mr. Marcus or any of Plaintiffs' counsel?

MR. MARCUS: I believe I've seen it on the Department of Corrections website. I haven't seen it filed as an exhibit in this matter.

THE COURT: So in terms of looking at that, which is what they put out publicly, would you view what they've proposed doing as insufficient?

MR. MARCUS: Yes, your Honor. I believe that they have proposed that they are giving personal protective equipment to high-risk now. I believe "high-risk" is the
term they used.
Again, this is assuming that Defendants are actually doing that. We have substantial evidence from the record showing that even high-risk identified by Defendants are not given that.

THE COURT: I'll get to that later. That's why I said "assuming they do what they say they're doing."

My understanding is that they were -- in terms of doing it, it would be people dealing with this -- as I understand it, it would be staff that are working in isolation, quarantine units, transportation, those who perform medical or escort details with positive or suspect residents and medical staff responding to the positive screens.

MR. MARCUS: So let me turn -- assuming that that is happening, let me turn to the legal question, which is whether those kinds of constraints can preclude a finding of deliberate indifference.

They don't, your Honor. The en banc Ninth Circuit in the case of Peralta versus Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, held that lack of resources is not a defense to a claim for relief because prison officials may be compelled to extinguish the pool of existing resources in order to remedy continuing Eighth Amendment violations.

And so --

THE COURT: Do you have a DC case?
MR. MARCUS: I don't have a DC Circuit case for that.

But the Ninth Circuit reasoning, I think, is persuasive. The idea that constraints can come into play at a damages calculation in assessing wantonness, the degree of wantonness of the Defendant's conduct, I think is established. But it should not preclude a finding of Eighth Amendment indifference.

And in fact, here, we think that it even greatly supports our argument that they're deliberately indifferent because it demonstrates that Defendants know their policies and procedures that they should be taking, and yet they are not doing so in fact. And I'm holding off on that because we're assuming for the moment that these policies and procedures are happening.

The other case that I would point you to is the Supreme Court decision in Brown versus Plata, where the Supreme Court held that Defendants -- that even where resources were inadequate -- that was a prison overcrowding case -- even where resources were inadequate, there was still an Eighth Amendment violation that required substantial efforts on Defendants' behalf.

So no. We don't think the constraints here are a finding of deliberate indifference, particularly where we're
seeking prospective injunctive relief and not damages.
THE COURT: Mr. Bluming, do you need the question again or do you want to go ahead and answer?

MR. BLUMING: Well, your Honor, I can address some of the points that Mr. Marcus raised. If your Honor has additional questions beyond that, I'm happy to deal with those, too.

Your Honor posed a question as an inquiry that, assuming that the Department of Corrections people are doing what they are in fact saying they're doing, if that precludes a finding of deliberate indifference. As your Honor noted, there's public information on the Department of Corrections website about their use of PPE. And as we noted in our -- in the declaration of Warden Johnson, it is being reserved for high-risk staff.

And so it's not a question in that instance of a lack of resources; it's a question of essentially whether there are enough resources for inmates to be able to take care of themselves and enough resources for the staff to be able to basically manage the population.

And so as to hand sanitizer, for example, regardless of whether there is a shortage of hand sanitizer or whether the law would require DOC to procure more hand sanitizer, which I'll discuss in a moment, the warden's declaration asserts a fact, not just a policy, but a fact,
that the residents get a bar of soap every week.
So the question is: Do they have the capacity to maintain personal hygiene? And the warden's declaration, which again asserts the fact, despite the Plaintiffs' assertions otherwise, as the Department being fully on policies, that they do have access to supplies. And also, it references the fact that there actually is hand sanitizer, despite the supply issues, available in one of the facilities to residents but not in the other one. So we'll note that.

But in terms of the lack of resources, whether the constraints such as that could warrant a finding of deliberate indifference, we have some issues about the deliberate indifference standards for the Fifth versus the Eighth Amendment. We believe it's the same standard. We can get into that later. But I'll just take the case of Brown versus Plata, which the Plaintiff, Mr. Marcus, just mentioned.

So I believe they did find that after years of litigation that intervention was warranted under those circumstances there. But that was only after extensive factual finding, years of factual finding, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

But the point is that for that intervention to be warranted, it's not just that, you know, maybe in the
absence of -- there may be constraints. Notwithstanding, there has to be a robust record created involving not, you know, declarations and records that happened over six days, as we've done in the temporary restraining order, but over years.

So it has to be at least sufficient. It doesn't have to be years. There's no time constraint. But there has to be a sufficient process of vetting the evidence and cross-examining witnesses and procuring different kinds of evidence so that the Court can get a true and accurate sense of what's going on on the ground.

And Plaintiffs have stated very loud and clear that they dispute the evidence that the Department has put forward. And that's understood.

THE COURT: Mr. Bluming, I don't think you need to get into that. I'll have some questions and issues with that later.

But I will note here, this is an emergency. I mean, this is a pandemic. The numbers are increasing. I don't think there's a lot of time to -- it's going to have to be done on an expedited basis. There's not time to have a whole series and go through the usual evidentiary hearings and things back and forth. This is going to have to be faster than that. I'll just say that. I didn't want to cut you off.

Is there anything else you wanted to state with that argument?

MR. BLUMING: Well, your Honor, in response to that specific point, if $I$ may, that too is understood; and that's why in other states, as they've pointed out, where this sort of matter has been adjudicated on a broad basis, it has been done in the state court because state court employees can present that sort of relief in a much more expedited manner because they are not constrained by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which would prohibit -restrict the kind of relief this Court could afford on such a limited record for precisely that reason, prevent federal intervention without a very clear and fully developed sense that that's more the available remedies; and perhaps that comes additionally later.

THE COURT: Mr. Marcus, do you want to respond to anything that you didn't before?

MR. MARCUS: I wanted to add, your Honor, our strongest point on deliberate indifference is not just the lack of adequate access to hand sanitizer or soap. We have men who are coughing up blood who have not been able to see a doctor despite putting seven sick calls requests in. We have people who are working in the kitchen who are displaying symptoms of coronavirus who are being forced to work in the kitchen, where they're infecting other people in
the jail.
The provision of soap and hand sanitizer are important, and they would help mitigate the spread of the virus. But the real shocking evidence here goes far beyond the lack of hand sanitizer or soap. It is systemic indifference to people who are showing symptoms and have not been able to be tested or be treated.

THE COURT: In the opposition -- this is directed to the Defendants. In the opposition, you indicate that -and I'll quote this -- "DOC's medical staff has adopted policies and guidelines based on the recommendations of," I assume, "the Department of Health and CDC and outside experts."

Who are your outside experts? You don't indicate who they are.

MR. BLUMING: I believe that that is noted in the declaration of Beth Jordan to the record. And at some point -- I'll identify the paragraph. But it's the -- so Dr. Jordan, who is the medical director for the Department of Corrections, states in Paragraph 10 of her declaration at 20-2 that she has been consulting regularly with the leading expert on infectious diseases and correctional health, Dr. Anne Spalding from Emory University. She's the point person for the NCCHC, which is the body of correctional facilities, and she has the expertise.

THE COURT: In terms of the Defendants, then, the professional opinion of some of the experts from the Defendants that have taken -- indicate that they've taken substantial steps and that what they've done has met the requirements. Is this just simply a matter of different professional judgment or is it something else? This is Plaintiffs' opportunity to answer.

MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, I just wanted to start by looking at what Dr. Jordan actually said at Paragraph 10. She said, quote, "We spoke" -- this is referring to her conversation with Dr. Spalding. "We spoke by phone yesterday and discussed the measures DOC has implemented."

Dr. Jordan does not say what information she shared with Dr. Spalding. It doesn't seem as if any of the policies were developed in consultation with her. It seems as if she was offered a chance to review them after the fact, but not that they developed any policies and procedures in consultation with them.

Further, Dr. Jordan does not claim to have any personal knowledge about the implementation of those policies.

And so this conversation with Dr. Spalding runs headlong into the same problem where neither Dr. Jordan nor Warden Johnson explain whether or not they've even been to the jail in the last three weeks or any --

THE COURT: Excuse me.

Mr. Marcus, I'm trying to go through this in a particular way because I did not want to have this taken over with how the attorneys wanted to do it, but how I wanted to do it, in order for me to make a ruling.

I'm aware there's a dispute here, and I'm going to get to it at the end in terms of different ways of resolving the -- resolving expeditiously the obvious gap between what Plaintiffs are saying and what the Defendants are saying in their declaration. I'll well aware of that. So let's move on the issues that I've identified and then we'll get back to that.

I would agree that I don't have Dr. Jordan's declaration in front of me. But let me ask Mr. Bluming, do you want to respond in terms of the consultation with the expert? Has it been just simply a phone conversation or has it been something that's been more robust?

MR. BLUMING: So, your Honor, Paragraph 10 specifically states that -- Dr. Jordan says, quote, "I communicate regularly by phone and email with Dr. Anne Spalding."

And so our understanding is that they're in regular communication, even though she did reference one conversation in her declaration. And again, we had to hurry and put together a record pretty quick. So all the
information out there might not have made it into the record. We're happy to follow up with more details, if that would aid the Court. But the declaration on the record doesn't state all the facts.

THE COURT: Let me get away from the confrontation and get to what actually was involved.

Let me move to the Plaintiffs. Does the DC Superior Court's process that they've established to adjudicate the release of the inmates prevent Plaintiffs from showing any kind of likelihood of irreparable injury?

I had spoken to -- let me update you on what they are doing. I think Mr. Fowler had some information, but I think it's based on observations. And I actually contacted the court over there in terms of the chief judge as well as Judge McKenna, who is spearheading what they are doing.

As I understand it, it provided before the Court reduced their operations a list of each of the judges of the defendants who had a medical alert that had been sent to the jail and asked each of the judges to look at each of those cases individually to decide if there should be some sua sponte action.

I understand that some of those cases were reviewed.

On April 1st, the Department of Corrections provided an updated list of misdemeanants after they went
through and added -- this is an ongoing process -- of their proceeding and adding on to the credits that basically make them more eligible. As time goes by, more and more of them are eligible to be actually released.

The list, which I did have an opportunity to look at quickly, some have some duplicates in it because they have defendants and they have all the charges. Some have more than one. The first, which we talked about at the scheduling conference last week, the Government was provided with a list of just -- a whole series of cases that involved particular offenses where the likelihood of any danger or public safety concerns would not be present. So that would eliminate domestic violence, stalking cases, solicitation of minors, those kinds of cases. They were given two business days to look at the whole list and they came back with whatever they did in terms of their responding to that particular one.

What the Court did is they went ahead and made some decisions without having any hearings or contacting counsel based just strictly on the papers. Some of those were taken care of.

As I understand it, the Public Defender Service filed an omnibus, I guess -- I don't know whether it was a motion or a case.

And is it correct, Mr. Marcus, that they don't
have -- that those who were sentenced as misdemeanants don't have attorneys? The majority of them actually still have attorneys on the record that are listed, and so they've contacted them unless they've withdrawn. And some of it is client input in terms of whether they're looking at additional information, medical information that might make a difference as seen from the outside, those kinds of things.

So whether or not the Government opposed, there were certain rulings that were done on the papers.

In terms of $\mathrm{C}-10$, which is the new arrests, the chief judge expanded greatly the use of citations at the police stations, where they're released automatically. In domestic violence, they do need to be brought to the court. There are no three-day holds. So if the -- and the next ones need to be notified.

Probable cause and detention hearings would be handled in one and could be danger or safety to the community. So there's no bench warrants in these cases, no weekend jail sentences if there are any.

And as you know, usually the calendar is 90 to 100 people a day. That is down to about 15 to 20 a day, as I understand it. And those are ones that have fallen into the category of issues relating to danger of potential public safety concerns.

They started, I believe, yesterday, or they intended to. So for those that have been arrested, they were releasing them from lockup directly, not bringing them up into the courtroom if there was no request. But every new arrest, an attorney is appointed in each case. At the hearings, there generally have been two stand-in attorneys. They have one courtroom, which is the 115, which is connected to the DC Jail. DC Superior has limits as to how many rooms they have with video connected that can be used by either the federal court or the local court. So 115 is one courtroom where you have an attorney on the phone, the defendant in the jail on the video and the judge on court video.

And all they're doing all day long is dealing with motions, bond motions, whether they're misdemeanants or felonies.

And the goal is, as I understand it -- I don't know whether they've met it -- but the goal is to have the hearings within one day of motions being filed.

From the federal court side -- and I'll just touch base with you shortly on that: FPD, the Federal Public Defender, and a designated person at the US Attorney's Office has a slew of the requests; and if they're consented to, they've been presented to the individual judges that have the cases. And as far as I know, they've been granted.

So it's really only -- the only ones we're getting as actual motions are ones where they're being contested. And in some of those instances, we've asked for additional medical information, something to indicate that they're at risk because of their medical condition.

There are some cases that are obviously in both courts as well, which is an additional issue.

The last information that I received yesterday is that a total of 127 bond review motions had been reviewed and granted. Now, because some of these involve more than one charge for the defendants, they would have more than one case.

As I understand it, in terms of individuals, approximately 108 individuals have been released on bond review motions, 56 felony defendants and 52 misdemeanants. And 48 of those misdemeanants have been released to the sentence recalculation with the good-time credits. They're working on -- it's obviously a work in progress in terms of getting a better sense of the number of felony defendants that have been released on the motions.

As far as I know, in terms of the contested -- let me just say, a number of these cases have been held in abeyance in terms of additional progress the defendants' counsel have asked for. There also is in some instances a requirement that the victims be notified. So some of them
have -- the hearing has been held in abeyance so they could get this information before they could make a particular decision.

And so the rest of the motions are -- if they're not done in 115, then they're done specifically by the judges who have the cases. Domestic violence cases are being handled by a judge of the domestic violence division. And the number of sentenced misdemeanants have been cut in half since last week from 94 down to 46 . There will be further releases as some of the attorneys discuss with their clients their willingness to be on probationary terms, which of course they have to consent to.

But the key feature has been to take a look at whether they pose a danger to the community and what kinds of public safety issues.

So from Superior Court -- and I don't know what the Department of Corrections has, but this is -- it doesn't include anybody released in parole cases. But the number of individuals that PDS has has declined by over 200 since March 13th from 1,288 to 1,083. And in CTF, by over 120 since March 13th, from 545 to 424. So those are what the Superior Court has provided me through talking to the two principal judges that are involved with it.

And obviously, it's an evolving process, trying to get through them as quickly as possible. The principal
concern on their part is public safety. And they know whether the Public Defender has had any conversations with the Court, or did, so that we could set up a system to move these through as quickly as possible.

Mr. Marcus, do you know besides either that motion or -- have there been discussions? Mr. Marcus?

MR. MARCUS: I'm not sure, your Honor. I am not sure. I know about the lawsuit, but I'm not privy to informal or formal conversations.

THE COURT: Does anybody in the Public Defender Service that's on the phone? Do you know?

Okay. I'll get back to that issue shortly. But they are certainly moving, from my perspective, it would seem to be expeditiously.

Let me get back to the Plaintiffs.
Does the DC claims, what they say is public interest in permitting defendants to carry out their authorized correctional functions, prevent injunctive relief, since this injunctive relief is obviously not maintaining the status quo, but is a proactive one? And is there a circuit case that deals with any kind of deference that needs to be provided to Corrections? Do you know? Mr. Marcus or whomever?

MR. MARCUS: I think the leading case on that question, your Honor, is Campbell versus McGruder. That's a

DC Circuit case from 1978. That case squarely held that the federal courts there had actual -- was properly reviewing the conditions at the Department of Corrections facilities. Of course, it recognizes that the Department of

Corrections -- that there is a state interest in the operation of the Department of Corrections. I think that is -- that there is no doubt about that.

But the case held that where, as here, there are constitutional violations as state and unconstitutional conditions alleged, that the federal court can and should review those claims.

THE COURT: Mr. Bluming, do you want to respond to either the Superior Court issue or the public interest argument, a response to it? Mr. Bluming?

MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, in terms of a Superior Court process, we would have to consult with our Public Safety Division to see if they have information to highlight for Mr. Marcus. I'm not privy to what has gone on over there. But again, I'm happy to follow up with the Court with more information.

In terms of the public interest, Campbell versus McGruder is actually very different, because that case is a 1978 DC Circuit case. It was taken after the case was filed in 1971, went to trial, and the judge made a finding that -or the District Court make a finding in 1975 after four
years of discovery had a full trial.
So the argument that we have made, that there can never be a public interest or that the public interest in allowing the Department of Corrections to carry out its functions can never, you know -- will always preclude injunctive relief on the merits -- but this is not on the merits. This is a temporary restraining order that is being litigated in less than a week.

And so our argument is there's a public interest in allowing -- in not offending the institutions -- you know, state and local governments, without much more robust findings and a clear adversarial process, and the case law that we've cited in our brief supports that.

MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, may I briefly be heard on the Superior Court process? I think I omitted my answer there.

So a couple points: The first is, the process in Superior Court is only addressing a fraction of the proposed class members. As your Honor knows, we're talking about 100 or 150 people who are eligible for that process and we are bringing claims on behalf of 1600 residents at the jail.

The second point I wanted to note about the medical --

THE COURT: Excuse me a minute.
It is a broader group, although I don't think it
is 1600 anymore. But anyhow, it is large and certainly is well over 1,000.

My point is, though, that people that are there presumably have either been sent there by Superior Court, either pretrial, post-trial or sentenced, and the federal court. And nobody's there under those circumstances as far as I know. Correct?

MR. MARCUS: And parole conditions.
THE COURT: Right. Go ahead.
MR. MARCUS: That's correct. But as far as the Superior Court process that your Honor referenced, that's only looking at 100 to 150 people.

The other point I wanted to note is with the medical alert. Those medical alerts as far as we understand are current, immediate medical emergencies. They don't cover ongoing conditions like asthma or diabetes, heart conditions or cancer that the CDC claims put people in higher risk from death or serious injury.

So as far as addressing the irreparable harm, we think it's sufficient and we think that we've established irreparable harm or at least the likelihood of success of irreparable harm for everyone at the jail, not just those with elevated risk, people with preexisting condition.

THE COURT: Let me just say, I only mentioned the medical alert because for a practical matter they at least
took a look at them.
I agree with you that the medical condition may be at a particular time. What I'm assuming is happening, as it is in the federal court, is that if people have existing conditions or problems, it's hard to get the medical records from the Department of Corrections; but they are getting records from the community, which is -- generally, the people we have from federal court are not going to be sentenced, or we have only a few people that are at the tail end of them, that the Bureau of Prisons may not have taken.

They've been provided with the information on medication for diabetes, asthma, those kinds of things, which we would need to do, which is why some of these hearings have been held in abeyance in order to get the information in to present it, which obviously would influence it; and you balance it in with the rest of the information that you have.

I only mentioned the medical alerts because they went to the trouble to at least look at those that on the way into Corrections had some medical problems.

Anything else?
MR. MARCUS: Just briefly. I have just had one additional point, your Honor.

There is a major -- even assuming that these bond review hearings -- and obviously, they're ongoing. There's
a major backlog, as your Honor knows, and the Superior Court is trying to get through them. But it's accomplishing, I believe, on the order of 10 to 15 a day. And there remains a major backlog. And our final point on this is that the Superior Court process is not addressing the conditions at the jail.

THE COURT: I'm not -- I didn't get into that.
I think that the conditions have come up, as I understand it, which they are in our court as well, is they're coming up when basically there's an issue about community safety or dangerousness, et cetera. And you're looking at balancing it against that as to what other things there are, if they're not medical conditions, other kinds of things that you take into account. You take a look at the conditions. And that's when they've been brought up both, I believe, in Superior Court as well as here.

My point is that some of these hearings can be done quickly. Some of them are going to require a little more time if they need to contact victims, if they need to figure out if there need to be releases; not the defendants particularly, although even those, but some of them just to make sure that they have -- that they have reporting conditions, that Pretrial Services looks and puts them into particular programs and getting other information. So this is something that isn't that quick. But I
think the group that's left are the group predominantly that they are working their way through, are the ones where there is an issue relating to danger and the public support. It's going to take a little bit of time to do it. But frankly, I think within a week they've done a fairly decent job of getting it down.

But that moves into my next question.
Before I do, Mr. Bluming, is there anything else you wanted to add?

MR. BLUMING: No, your Honor. Nothing.
THE COURT: Now, the Plaintiffs have suggested that in reducing the inmate population that there be -- in addition to the additional good-time credits, et cetera, that there be some expert that would provide some expertise on that.

It's not clear to me from reading the papers, frankly, what this expert would do. Would it be assisting the Court in determining releases? Would the expert assist at DOC? Would the expert provide specific recommendations about people to be released or is it going to be sort of general recommendations? Is it that with this population you need to reduce it by $X$ percentage in order to prevent the spread of the infection?

So to Mr. Marcus or to whomever on the Plaintiffs' side, what is this expert supposed to be doing?

MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, there are experts available, and we've contacted several of them, and they are available if the Court chooses to appoint them, who are experts in jail downsizing. Predominantly, they are experts considering public safety.

One of these experts is James Austin, who is a man who has developed a risk assessment tool used by CSOSA here in DC and has developed the prisoner classification tool that the Department of Corrections uses.

He is an expert who consults with jail and prison systems across the country, and he recommends the percentage of jail or prison reduction that's necessary to assure reasonable safety and he recommends systems that the Court can put in place to implement that kind of downsizing.

So we envision here the expert can review the conditions at the Department of Corrections, as they do in other cases; recommend a target number where the Department of Corrections can safely assure reasonable safety for residents; and then recommend to the Court categories of people who can be safely released and under what conditions, categories of people who could be put on home confinement or could have their jail terms suspended but then required to report back when the pandemic is over.

So it's a relatively common field. But the specialty involves determining the right number and then
implementing a system for the court to get to that number.
But obviously, the Court retains the discretion, all of the authority to actually implement the recommendation. It's solely to advise the Court on the number and the process to release.

THE COURT: So you say he was involved in developing those risk assessments that CSOSA uses. And CSOSA would be involved in these cases in terms of making -assuming that they're using this risk assessment tool. I mean, they would be involved in -- and in release would obviously be concerned. So I'm assuming you're already using that.

Do you know?
MR. MARCUS: I know CSOSA is using the risk assessment tool that Mr. Austin has developed. I presume that they are still using it in light of people that have already been released.

Again, we are not suggesting that people be released wholesale without any kind of conditions. Of course, a number of people that we suggest -- that we think would be released under our proposal would be put on conditions of confinement and, of course, on CSOSA and probation; and other authorities who would be conducting that provision would be consulted as well.

THE COURT: Well, I'm assuming that's happening.

I understand from Superior Court -- and I know it certainly is true with the federal court -- that they are being consulted in terms of putting them in high-intensity programs or various other programs in terms of either that, the high-intensity program, and then there's a couple of other programs that they can put them in. And most of them are being checked with if they're pretrial to figure out and get their input as to what -- if we release them, what the conditions would need to be in order to release them.

So I'm just trying to see what additional thing would be added beyond what frankly is probably already taking place.

MR. MARCUS: Sure.
I think the main -- I think the main value added, your Honor, is that we are talking about a systemic and rapid problem that demands a systemic and rapid solution. And if the case -- I think that CSOSA is being consulted on these individual matters. We're talking about an expert to recommend the necessary rapid and substantial reduction that could ensure the reasonable safety of people.

THE COURT: I'm not sure what -- in terms of what you use -- let's assume for purposes of this discussion that the risk assessment tool was used. I mean, all of these agencies that do pretrial release, probation, et cetera, they all have risk assessment tools and they all use them,
especially when the offenses involve some safety concerns and danger. They're already using it.

So I'm trying to figure out what this person would do that would add beyond what they're already doing.

MR. MARCUS: Sure.

So first and foremost, the expert would be able to determine what number of people can safely be held at the jail, given the current crisis and conditions. And then the expert can recommend based on the risk assessment tool -I'm just giving an example here: Say all people who score below 10 on that risk assessment tool who also have a preexisting medical condition, say, asthma or diabetes, that puts them at a higher risk, that $I$ recommend a release of all people in that category under home confinement, something like that.

That is not being done on any kind of systemic basis now. And it requires the Courts ultimately to balance the risk of substantial injury and death to an individual with public safety that we think can be implemented with these risk assessment tools.

THE COURT: Mr. Bluming, do you want to respond?
MR. BLUMING: Yes, your Honor.
I think this has to be considered in the context of relief that Plaintiffs had asked for. This is Item No. 1 from that proposed order, the TRO.

THE COURT: I have it here. Let me just find it. MR. BLUMING: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BLUMING: So Item No. 1 in that proposed order of which I actually -- I don't have the docket number in front of me. In the TRO application, the first thing they ask for is that the Department of Corrections be ordered to immediately take all actions within their power to reduce the inmate population of the DC Jail and staff, including but not limited to, power pursuant to the COVID-19 response and Emergency Act claims.

And our understanding is they want an expert to facilitate that leap.

The problem is, as we noted in our brief, the COVID-19 Emergency Amendment Act gives authority to DOC to release individuals from custody on their own authority; that is, what that Act authorizes is it authorizes the Department of Corrections to increase the good-time credit of individuals serving misdemeanor sentences only to effectuate a more expedient release.

But that current number within the DC Jail as we understand it is a number of between about 70 and 75 people. I think it was 94 people as of March 24. On April 1st, it was about 20 people released pursuant to the statutory relief mandated by the DC Council. And so that remains a
total of 70 -- about between 70 and 75 people.
And so with a current population at the DC Jail of 1550 people, if the Plaintiffs' proposal of the experts is that the expert was evaluating how to release a broad swath of people, it sounds like that would be broader than DOC's actual authority to do that.

And even insofar as they have an expert to assist with those 70 to 75 individuals, the Department of Corrections was granted the statutory authority to assign good-time credits by the DC Council and given the discretion to make that assessment itself. It has already been using that discretion in releasing individuals. And there's no reason that they can't continue doing that, you know. And they have the expertise. In doing that, they're doing that presumably, as your Honor referenced, in coordination with CSOSA and others.

THE COURT: As I understand it, the expert would provide and say within the facility, the two facilities, that -- what it would require in terms of what the reductions should be.

Have you all either through discussions or experts or whatever determined what the population should get down to in order to be able to do a distancing and several other things? Have there been any ballpark figures or anything in terms of the corrections?

MR. BLUMING: No, your Honor. We have not discussed that with our clients. But we're happy to go back and speak to them and find out more information for the Court.

THE COURT: Mr. Marcus, do you have -- does your expert, James Austin, does he have -- I mean, I assume he's been in the jail? Or has he not?

MR. MARCUS: Not in the last couple of weeks, your Honor. But certainly he has been in the Department of Corrections before.

I want to briefly just clarify something: that the expert that we're talking about is not solely to recommend to DOC, who under their statutory authority can release the 100 or so people there. It's to recommend to the Court the type of release mechanism for the 1500 or so other people who we agree DOC does not have the ability to release, but the Court certainly does.

And so while -- and part of our argument is that the DOC has moved too slowly in releasing the people that they have the ability to release. But putting that aside, the release expert that we've requested is not to advise DOC on that limited population, but it's to provide to the Court a number of people that would be appropriate and could be held safely at the jail and how to reach that number, which the Court certainly has the authority through habeas to
release.
THE COURT: Do you have --
MR. BLUMING: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Do you have some figure --
I'll get back to you in a minute, Mr. Bluming.
So do you have some figure as to what you think the population needs to get back to -- to get down to, according to your expert? Or has that not been developed yet?

MR. MARCUS: It has not been developed yet.
And in our conversations with experts, there are a variety of factors that they consider. Dr. Stern talked about this in his expert declaration towards the end. I believe that one of the last paragraphs talks about how -the kinds of things that you would look at in determining how much downsizing is necessary. But it includes things like what the square footage is, can you establish six feet between people, those kinds of things.

But given the area of expertise, jail downsizing, it's an area for which there are a number of experts. And we've spoken to more than just Mr. Austin, and we're able to provide the Court with at least three names and résumés of people who we've consulted and are available and interested and could start immediately.

THE COURT: Do you want to respond, Mr. Bluming?

MR. BLUMING: Yes, your Honor.
I actually just want to rebut the point that the Court would have the authority to grant release of -releasing individuals not within the DOC's authority.

But we actually think that that authority -- that the parties are constrained by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 USC 3626, which specifies the circumstances under which the Court can release individuals in custody pursuant to prison litigation, that it has to be pursuant to certain procedures and that the Court is specifically constrained from doing so without first -- without first imposing other remedies and ensuring that those remedies are not being followed before determining that that is the remedy.

Now, the Court could grant a writ of habeas corpus. If the Court were to grant a writ of habeas corpus as to any individual in particular, that individual could be released pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus.

But again, looking at their release, both in the -- in their TRO application filing and in their complaint itself, they actually haven't requested the release of any of the named Plaintiffs. One of the named Plaintiffs, by the way, we understand has been released from custody, Plaintiff Keon Jackson. But the rest of them have not asked for their open release.

And so to the extent that they are seeking habeas
relief in the form of release from custody, we think that the TRO would constrain the Court from releasing others, and the fact that they haven't sought their own release would constrain the Court from releasing them as currently proposed.
With --

THE COURT: Do you want to respond to this last thing about your client?

MR. MARCUS: So we think that the Court does have the authority even if we have not asked for the release of our clients, although I believe our complaint does seek the writ of habeas corpus for all class members, which does of course include our clients.

But the argument that we've set up is that the overpopulation of the jail is what causes the injury to our named Plaintiffs. And the Court can take remedial action to reduce the population and thus redress the injury to our named Plaintiffs.

But I believe we have asked for release of our named Plaintiffs. And in any event, the Court still has the authority to grant release under habeas to everyone in the proposed class, not just the named Plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Let me move on.
In terms of -- this is directed to the Defendants.
What steps have you taken to promote social
distancing?
MR. BLUMING: Yes. So -- well, a few things, your Honor. This weekend, the jail had -- the jail had a policy of when they release individuals for recreation, for example, into a recreation area, they'd previously -- before COVID-19, they would release the entire unit into the recreation area at once.

And we were told I believe last week that they were instead only being released for recreation a half unit at a time to give them more space.

We also know that as of this weekend, as of Saturday -- and this is information on the -- we believe it's on the Department of Corrections website, but I can clarify later that that's case -- that the jail implemented a stay-in-place -- a medical stay-in-place order to ensure social distancing that included various measures that -your Honor, I apologize; I'm just reviewing the document -stating that individuals are now being moved between facilities to assess an emergency situation, that certain group activities would be -- we are told now that there are currently no house-side visitors coming into groups or anything like that in order to prevent the rate from rising and various similar measures.

One in particular again on this list -- and I believe it's on the DOC website. I can pull up the terms.

It states that they are stopping all group activities and minimizing the number of residents participating in a recreation area and allows no more than ten at a time. I think previously I believe we were -- our information was that the units vary in size, but it could be as many as 80 people.

So pre-COVID-19, we had 80 people in the recreational area together. At the end of last week, we were down to half that, so 40 people at a time. So that is a new policy. So those are some of the specific measures that we're aware of.

THE COURT: Let me move on. MR. MARCUS: I have a brief point on that, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Marcus. MR. MARCUS: First, it speaks volumes that on April 4th, three weeks into the pandemic, the DOC was dealing with 40 people at a time in the recreation yard. We think that that goes to -- shows deliberate indifference here.

A second key point, though, is that staff can't practice social distancing either. And that is important because as the number of staff -- DOC staff infections rise -- and it's currently at seven -- they obviously continue to interact with residents. And so the more staff
that contract the virus, the more likely that residents are.
And finally, the vast majority of people still there cannot practice social distancing because they live in a cell with another person. Numerous of our declarants talk about their concern that their cellmate is coughing and have it and that as a result they will contract it as well.

THE COURT: Moving on to the next question, this is to the Defendants:

You've submitted various declarations, but I'll focus on Dr. Jordan and Warden Johnson. They indicated that -- they made statements about what the policies were, what was being done and presumably what's on the website, which is what was provided by Mr. Glover, that answers questions about what precisely they're doing, which relates in many instances to the conditions that the Plaintiffs have raised.

Do you know if that's based on personal knowledge? In other words, have they gone into the jail to see if this has happened? Or is this based on a hierarchy system of supervisors within the jail telling them that these things have been implemented?

MR. BLUMING: Well, our understanding, your Honor -- and this is stated in the declarations --

THE COURT: Sorry. There was a phone ringing there.

MR. BLUMING: Each of the declarations reference that. Both the declaration of Warden Johnson references that and the declaration of Dr. Jordan, 20-2, starts off on the first paragraph stating that this are based on their personal knowledge and observation and that includes -- that is information provided by the District of Columbia police in the course of official duties, that that is standard for the management of a department.

And so our understanding is that when, for example, Warden Johnson declared as an example in Paragraph 6 in which he says that in addition to standard facility-cleaning practices, DOC cleans the common spaces in housing units and common areas of the facilities every two years, that that statement is a statement based on personal knowledge on the type of grounds and not a statement of policy.

Now, whether it is, you know, based on his personal, you know, visitation to every unit to see if it's cleaned every two hours or whether part of it is based on information being passed to him from other people, we'd have to follow up on that and what the specifics are personally. But it's based on his personal knowledge nonetheless. And the same is true of Beth Jordan.

Now, it is true that both of them do attest to certain policies that have been in place.

THE COURT: At the end, I'll go through what I view as the gap between what's being said for both sides. But I don't want to really get into too much detail here. But I was interested to know whether they've actually gone into the jails and seen whether they -- I mean, it wouldn't be unusual for them to rely on others that are at the facility to tell them it's being implemented. But $I$ just wanted to know if they had actually gone to the jail and checked and done some inspections or had somebody actually inspect to make sure these things were actually being implemented.

MR. BLUMING: Yes, your Honor. Our understanding is they are present in the facilities. Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Marcus, anything you want to say? MR. MARCUS: I would say we simply don't know from the declaration whether that particular paragraph that opposing counsel referenced is based on personal knowledge. The beginning says, "Some of what I'm about to say is based on what others have told me and some is based -- and some is based on personal knowledge." But there's nothing in the record that shows that that particular section or anything else in the declaration is based on personal knowledge. It might be admissible here today, but it's still hearsay nonetheless.

THE COURT: Well, we're going to get into this a
little more. But I did want to ask that.
The Plaintiffs contend that they have standing -and this is an issue that Defendants raised -- have standing based on their risk of contracting COVID-19.

So steps that may not directly affect the named Plaintiffs, such as the release of misdemeanants or certain conditions at the jail, which still redress Plaintiffs' injuries because sufficient steps reduce Plaintiffs' risk of contracting the virus.

So this is a theory of standing that is cognizable. In other words, since we all know it's very contagious, if you improve the conditions, they're less likely to get the virus. And so it's a different standard. It's not as narrow as you have set out. But do you view it as cognizable or not?

Mr. Bluming, for the Defendants, I want to know what your position is.

MR. BLUMING: Well, your Honor, our position is that I guess we're not exactly sure. I mean, it sounds like an unusual theory of standing, standing of specific remedies, which is the kind of standing that we're most concerned with, which is on which grounds they have requested that certain other things happen as to other people. Even in light of their position that sort of, you know, well-being and adequate provisions within the
facility, you know, would run to everybody's specific health, the question is still: What standing do they have to seek particular remedies?

And, you know, where --

THE COURT: Excuse me.

Give me an example of one that would not -- you've raised the possibility of getting the virus. I mean, all of the conditions for the most part are -- leaving aside legal access for the moment, but they're either reducing the population so you'd be able to have social distancing, et cetera. And also, you would ensure that they would not get the virus, which would include death, since this is something that is as contagious it is.

So from that perspective, their argument as I understand it in summary terms is that these conditions meet the risk of their contracting the virus and therefore they do have standing to request -- I mean, all of these things will benefit others, but it will benefit them specifically in very summary terms, is their argument.

MR. BLUMING: Yes. We understood that that's their theory.

I mean, I guess just as a technical matter, some of the relief about communications with counsel and --

THE COURT: Putting that aside for now, they've raised issues with that. But let's stick to the conditions
for a second.
MR. BLUMING: Sure. I think it's not so much that -- the argument is that it wouldn't improve conditions for everyone; it's more that -- the release of inmates, for example, a specific item. It's been a pretty expansive theory of standing that an individual could say, "Well, I'm in an overcrowded facility, and so the remedy for me is that other people be released."

We recognize that there is a certain theoretical sense in which, you know, they've made a point. But to release those individuals as a remedy, in no other circumstance they have standing to do that. And it ends up being a remedy as to somebody else. That's really the problem with it. It's a little bit abstract. But I think that's why it's hard to sort of conceptualize what it is they're asking for in terms of that.

THE COURT: Well, I have to say that this is a situation that has not come up before, and so the law doesn't address it quite strictly. We've had viruses before, but none of them quite as contagious as this one and as pervasive as it seems to be.

They've never been -- we've never had one -- I don't know what they did in 1918, but -- in terms of calling it a pandemic. So we're in a totally different situation where really the case law isn't directed at the kind of
situation we have now. So it's going to have to be looking at analogies.

But it does seem to me it's not quite as restrictive in terms of it would have to benefit them specifically. The lower the population, the less likely -the more the social distancing, to take your argument, or that there are better sanitary conditions, et cetera, so that it doesn't spread, because it is continuing to go up in terms of when we started, of when they filed the lawsuit and where it is now, which is true in the community as well.

Let me give Mr. Marcus a quick response, an opportunity to respond to that.

MR. MARCUS: The two key cases here, your Honor, are Helling versus McKinney, 509 US 25, from 1993. The Supreme Court held that the risk -- that the cognizable injury is the risk of obtaining an infectious disease. In that case, the risk was the environmental tobacco smoke. Inmates brought this alleging the prison hadn't done enough to cut down on other inmates smoking tobacco.

And the Supreme Court held that it was -- they had alleged -- properly alleged standing where the remedy was the prison had to cut down on other people smoking tobacco because that increased the risk to particular people who had bronchitis or other diseases.

The other key case is Brown versus Plata, the

Supreme Court case that affirmed the downsizing of the California jail system that found exactly the remedy that opposing counsel just mentioned, that decreasing the prison -- the size of prisons redressed the injuries of people who would be remaining at the facility due to issues of overcrowding and access to medical care and things like that. And those are the two key cases that we think put us on clear grounds today.

MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, if I may briefly address that:

I actually don't know about Helling. I have to go back.

But Brown as I understand it was a class action with a certified class. And so, you know, it might be a little bit different if individuals are getting relief as part of a certified class. I think we would concede that it's something that we'd need to supplement for a standing issue.

And also, specifically as to what -- to Mr. Marcus's explanation of the cases, the question of standing, of specific remedies, it's not just standing, you know.

And as to Helling, again, you know, we can file a supplemental briefing on that.

THE COURT: Let me move on to another question.

This is directed to the Defendant again. Plaintiffs argue that the standard for success on the merits is different for pretrial detainees under the Fifth Amendment as opposed to the Eighth Amendment, which generally comes up for sentenced people. They contend that if they showed that the actions taken against pretrial detainees are objectively unreasonable, then the subjective intent of the Defendant is irrelevant.

Do you agree with that or not? And do you agree that there are two different standards in reading the material? Granted, this was material over a short period of time. You seem to conflate the standards for the pretrial and what $I$ would view as the standards for post-sentence or post-trial and put them all under the Eighth Amendment. And I'm not sure that that's correct.

MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, our view is that it is the same legal analysis even though it's the Fifth Amendment that pertains to the pretrial detainees and the Eighth Amendment to individuals that are sentenced.

It's our understanding that in assessing a case like this, assessing whether the conditions of confinement can pose an unconstitutional condition, that the same legal standard in both those cases be caused -- it essentially is a question under the case law of the right to be free from deliberate indifference.

We cite the Young case that noted both standards. And there's also another case that fits very well, Powers-Bunce versus DC. That's 479 F.Supp. 2d.

THE COURT: Is that in your papers?
MR. BLUMING: No, it is not.
But we did cite the Young case, which is in our brief, which does note that the standards are -- apply to standing in both groups because the question is the right to be free from deliberate indifference.

I would say that the Plaintiffs' argument on this point, their principal cite is to Kingsley, to the Supreme Court's decision. That was a case cited in determining whether excessive force used on a pretrial detainee constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

And in that case, all that was established was that the deliberate indifference standard -- it just passed down what else is deliberate in the deliberate indifference analysis. And we have seen no case out of the DC Circuit that has analyzed this. Kingsley not in this particular context, the question of a detainee alleging conditions of confinement that -- I guess access to medical care. And so we believe that the DC cases that we have cited correctly state the standard for that.

THE COURT: Mr. Marcus, do you have anything to add?

MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, Kingsley answers this question. And the logic of Kingsley makes clear that people who are confined to pretrial are presumed innocent. And the purpose of confinement for people pretrial cannot be punishment.

In contrast, one of the purposes of confinement for people who are held post-conviction can be punishment. And so the analysis has to be different.

Kingsley was a case involving excessive force, but it was an Eighth Amendment case. And the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment or at least the cruel and unusual punishment clause applied differently in the pretrial standard and specifically held that the subjective prong of deliberate indifference does not apply.

And I believe every circuit to have ruled on the narrow question that opposing counsel put, which is if excessive force in conditions of confinement are equivalent post-Kingsley, every circuit that's analyzed this issue has concluded that the Kingsley standard applies to conditions of confinement by the logic that $I$ just stated, that pretrial and post-conviction are different.

THE COURT: Mr. Bluming?
MR. BLUMING: Well, I'll just say that our
understanding of -- the Courts agree that pretrial detainees can't be punished.

But the question is not about punishment; it's about the right to be free from deliberate indifference of government officials. And while -- the right to be free from the deliberate indifference of government officials, if it applies to people who are post-conviction as well -- and it's not a question of who can be punished versus who can't. It's a question of essentially what -- I guess, what is the constitutionally acceptable environment to be in?

And that -- you know, in the Fifth Amendment context, you have the fact that, for example, an individual can be subject to punishment does not mean that no force can be used on them pretrial. Obviously, a person can -- if they are posing a threat to another, force can be used on them even if they have not been adjudicated guilty. The point is that that is not punishment; it is, you know, necessary precaution.

And that's sort of the -- we think the same context for the question about deliberate indifference. Obviously, individuals in pretrial can be confined subject to constitutional -- the constitutional environment. The question is: When did it exceed that environment?

THE COURT: Let me move to the legal part.
At this point, there have been no requirements in the legal -- that the attorneys needed to do in-person calls. And my recollection is that they are like cubicles
or something in terms of -- I don't know whether they've changed that in terms of cubicles. They've stopped that. They do need phones, from what $I$ understand, in terms of it not just being the managers, but a broader set of phones. But there's two questions I have here.

Ten minutes is not enough to have an intelligent conversation with your counsel about whether you should be pleading; if you're doing a sentencing, if you're trying to have some discussion with them about are they are going to accept in releasing them some additional questions of release or something of that nature?

What about, frankly, just giving them phones, cell phones, that don't have anything else on it, no Internet, nothing? You can take them back. They don't have to keep them. But they could certainly make longer calls and have a more informed discussion with them.

The way it's set up now, I mean, there's really no way of having really -- you can call them and find out how they're doing and have some information, but you're not going to be able to have discussions and move your cases forward if for instance you're filing -- if you need to file motions and you need to get some additional information from them.

Ten minutes isn't going to be enough. You need to expand it. And I realize that trying to do extra video is
not simple in terms of setting it up, so I'm not going to push that.

But I do think -- I see no reason why you can't get phones, give them the phones, have them make a longer phone call. They are not going to be able to -- just get it so they can only make phone calls. If you get it back, you can look and see whether they've been using it in some way.

What about that?
MR. BLUMING: Well, your Honor, candidly, we have not had a full discussion with our clients about that. We can go back and find out more information about that. But we're not sure what, if anything, would be entailed with doing that. And we'd want to speak further with our client about that.

THE COURT: Go back and talk to them. But I do think you need to do something more.

It's getting slightly better; but even if they all got an opportunity to have ten minutes of calls, which I'm not sure they're having, in terms of trying to set time frames to have this happen, as a practical matter, that's not long enough. If there's no other way of talking to your lawyer, if you can't have an intelligent and informed discussion about what should be filed in the cases -- and the number of these cases -- and I certainly have them in my court, and they're sitting over at the jail. When I've set
out their trial cases, they've got pretrial motions and things where they need -- ten minutes isn't going to be enough. And they need to be able to consult with their client and have a discussion.

I have a couple of people who have pleas that have been outstanding, which they'll probably continue. You can't have a discussion about a complicated plea in ten minutes. So ten minutes is not enough.

If you gave them phones -- and this is just a suggestion, and we could do something else. But it seems to me you don't have to add new phones. There are phones and you hand them out. They get to have a conversation. It's not monitored. There's nothing else on it, so there's no worry about them going off on the Internet or doing something like that. And they could have a longer conversation.

So I'm positing that. You need to come up with something on your own. But ten minutes, even if everybody got the ten minutes that they wanted, it is simply not enough.

And I understand videos and stuff is not simple and not easily done. We certainly have found that out at the court. But now you've got the three rooms and they're working all in the court. So one is in 115. We have -- as well as other -- they've scheduled it in our Superior Court
courtrooms. We have a short period in the federal court where we can do things, where we can have the defendant on the video and then the magistrate judges in federal court in order for them to be able to handle it. So I'm not sure that the video capacity is going to be easily augmented, although the problem should be looked at.

But the phones are easy. I don't know how expensive it is; but even a throwaway phone, it's better. You're not asking for anything else on it. All you're asking for is: Can you make a telephone call? Nothing else. And they hand them back. They don't take them back to their cells or whatever. I'm not suggesting that. But they could -- you could set it up that they could either be out in recreation making phone calls, whatever.

I'm going to ask you to check on that. And you need to come up with something better than just a ten-minute phone call. I'll leave it there.

I don't know whether, Mr. Marcus, you want to weigh in on that.

MR. MARCUS: The only -- I'll just state an
additional piece of information, your Honor: Under the new restricted movement policies, DOC residents are only allowed out of their cells for 30 minutes; and that's the window of time that that ten-minute phone call can take place.

Also, during their 30 minutes, they have to shower
and clean their cells and eat up food. So a number of clients that we've spoken to are foregoing the ten-minute calls because they need to do a number of things during those 30 minutes. I think that further strengthens the suggestion that they be given phones to make those calls. I think that makes a lot of sense.

THE COURT: Well, let me have you go back and have a discussion. I'm not limiting it to just that proposal, but that seems like an easy one to do. It wouldn't be that expensive and it would immediately provide more information. You'd have to figure out what way it would be done so they can make their phone calls.

MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, with the policies -- it sounds like your sound is cutting out at the last sentence. THE COURT: That's probably because I leaned back. I'm sorry.

Do you have -- beside the figures that I got from Superior Court, do you have any other figures or is that -does that roughly sound correct? I don't know whether they're figures for just Superior Court or whether they cover -- because the federal courts have been releasing people as well.

MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, off the top of my head, I don't have any additional figures. But I can report back to you on that.

THE COURT: Let me just look at my notes. This is to the Defendants:

The Plaintiffs talked about there being an unreasonable risk of harm in terms of the exposure and that it's substantially above those that are out in the community. And they've indicated that the infection rate there is seven times the infection rate in DC at large.

Do you have any response to that?
MR. BLUMING: No, your Honor. We're reviewing the data, obviously. And, you know, again, we're not keeping up with the numbers as they are. Our argument on this is stated in our brief. So I don't think we have anything to add right now.

THE COURT: The last question is on a legal issue. And it really is about -- you seem to disagree as to whether or not Plaintiffs should be held to a higher standard because they request a mandatory injunction rather than the prohibitory or the status quo.

I would say that, looking at the DC Circuit, unless there's something that's come down that I'm not aware of, that they have not specifically held that there is a higher standard. The cases more recently discussed looking closely and independently at success on the merits. But as far as I know, they have not set out a higher standard.

So do you have something that I don't know about?

Mr. Bluming?
MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, $I$ don't have a DC Circuit case that discusses that point.

In our brief, several cases of the District Court here have been interpreted to lead to that conclusion for no other reason than the assessment of the -- insofar as it's much more of a burden on the administration or agency to be taking affirmative action that it was not taking before as opposed to merely discontinuing something. We think that is encompassed within that factor, and that might be where that analysis comes from. But I'm not aware of a DC Circuit holding stating anything like that.

THE COURT: Mr. Marcus, do you have anything to add?

MR. MARCUS: Judge, the League of Women Voters case of the DC Circuit from 2016 is the most recent case on point. It explicitly held the DC Circuit has rejected any distinction between a mandatory and prohibitory injunction. And that's, we believe, the most recent Circuit statement on that matter.

THE COURT: Do they say that specifically or do they sort of indicate that they're not adopting it? I don't remember looking at that particular case. I don't remember the cite.

My recollection is that it was actually Judge

Kavanaugh who is now Justice Kavanaugh who indicated looking at the merits as a separate prong, not sliding it together as they have done in other cases.

MR. MARCUS: The quote that I have before me from League of Women Voters is, quote, "The DC Circuit has rejected any distinction between a mandatory and prohibitory injunction."

THE COURT: All right. And is that in your papers?

MR. MARCUS: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: We're now going to get to what I think
is what $I$ consider the thornier issue here, leaving aside the legal ones.

What I have is the two sets of declarations. I have the Plaintiffs' declaration, which indicates that -and I'll focus on -- this is on conditions, not other things. The declarations discuss other issue as well.

The declarations indicate that certain things are not being done at the jail or are not being followed at the jail.

The Department of Corrections has put in declarations mostly from I believe the warden and Dr. Jordan, and there may be some others that are in there, that indicate that these are the procedures and the needs being implemented. There is at least one, maybe two,
correctional officers that the Plaintiff has also put in its declaration.

So what I have is two sets of declarations factually indicating -- assuming that in looking at what was on the website for the Department of Corrections, it's certainly a good start. And it addresses many of the concerns that Plaintiff has raised about the conditions; not all of them, but certainly a number of them.

But the issue seems to be whether they're actually being implemented.

And from my perspective, I'd like to hear what you would recommend as to how I would reconcile these differing declarations as to whether the Department of Corrections has actually actively implemented them. In other words, are they actually doing this?

And I understand that these things are evolving and new things are coming in, because -- which they've listed as mitigating the spread of the virus. And my concern is that -- this is an emergency. I mean, it's a pandemic. The virus is continuing. We're getting more cases. I don't think we can go through and I don't think it's frankly going to be a useful way of doing it to have hearings where declarants testify as to this and somebody testifies as to something else. That works in other cases, but I don't think it's going to work here.

Frankly, somebody has to go in and inspect and say: Yes. They're doing the cleaning. They're given the bars of soap; they're given this; they're given that.

And I would like to get some idea as to how -- I'm thinking of either appointing an amici. I'm talking short term; I'm not discussing putting a full monitor in. We're discussing it in the context of a TRO at this point. Or perhaps some sort of an expert that will actually go in and do an inspection.

And one question $I$ had is either individuals that have done inspections who would be going in at the facility or the -- you've indicated organizations that have looked at the procedures and have thought they were adequate or whatever, whatever the language was that you used. So the American Correctional Association, the National Conference on Correctional Healthcare that supposedly has looked at the actual procedures. I don't know. Do they do inspections or implementation of these or do they just look at the features?

Do you know, Mr. Bluming?
MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, that $I$ don't know. And if they do regular inspections. I think for accreditation, perhaps they have to do regular inspections of the facilities. I don't know when the last one was done in relation to the outbreak. But I can find that out.

THE COURT: Are these accredited or is there a separate accreditation?

MR. BLUMING: Well, one is accredited and then there's a separate -- to be perfectly candid, your Honor, the distinction in my mind is a little bit fuzzy. But there's at least one accreditation body and possibly two.

But I would have to go -- I apologize for this -MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, we've spoken --

THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Marcus. Let me finish here.

Mr. Bluming, I do think -- I'd like your reaction to it, again, the reaction from you as to how I'm supposed to reconcile these differences. I don't see evidentiary hearings. One, they will take too long. Two, it's not going to work. You're going to have -- in terms of the people coming in, the higher-up people, and then you're going to have -- assuming we can get this all orchestrated, frankly, to have it done.

You need somebody to actually go in and see -unannounced, to go in and see whether these things need to be done and to work with Corrections if they're not being done as well as they could be, even though it looks like DOC has put these procedures in place that they require. They require training; they may require other kinds of assistance.

But do you have any suggestions in terms of how I reconcile them? There's a big gap in here, a disconnect, between what you're saying DOC people are doing, employees are doing and what they're giving the residents there, and what the Plaintiffs have come back with, which is totally and completely different.

MR. BLUMING: Yes, your Honor. We certainly recognize the dispute on the ground.

And I suppose that our view of the question is that in imposing some kind of inspector to settle on a remedy for a TRO would in essence be to credit the Plaintiffs' version of the events over the Defendants'.

And we of course disagree it that's --
THE COURT: Not necessarily. Not necessarily. I don't see why it would be favoring one over the other. What you would do is you're getting an independent person who would go in to see who's right. If it's Plaintiffs' declarations, are they correct about what they're saying? Are the Defendants correct about what they're saying? And they would come back independently.

I mean, there's only certain things that you'd look at in doing a whole accreditation. You're looking at certain specific conditions that have been put into place that are specifically directed at this virus. And, you know, the list isn't that long, frankly, of what they're
doing. But somebody independent. That's why I said an accreditation or group that's familiar with doing it or if you have suggestions of people who have worked with Corrections.

I know that Judge Sullivan in the federal court has the Interagency Detention Committee, which I know has a very large committee membership, both from the federal court, the local court; $\operatorname{PDS}$ is on it; $I$ know Mr. Glover is on it and a number of people. And they dealt with the issues of -- for instance, last year, I believe it was, with the issue of air conditioning. And they had people in who did inspections, et cetera, unannounced.

So it's been done. But it seems to me it would make it easier.

My whole point is, I'm not crediting one side or the other. I need to have an answer. And it's a fact answer. It's something where somebody goes and looks. Someone has to go in and actually look at it. So this isn't something where, you know, you can do it in any other way. And it would be these very limited issues that seem to be in contention.

MR. BLUMING: Sure.
And to the extent that your Honor would be inclined to order some kind of relief like that, we would certainly, you know, maintain that it should be an
independent individual appointed by the Court, ideally with the agreement of the parties, and that it would provide us time to go back and to discuss with our client what kind of individual is proposed and the right kind of individual that would do that.

THE COURT: It's an emergency. It would be in the context of a TRO and potentially a PI in terms of resolving some of these issues.

So we're talking about an emergency appointment. We're not talking about a permanent monitor that they've also asked for, or a more permanent monitor. I'm talking about someone who would come in as an emergency who could do this who would take a look at it and see whether it's being implemented or make suggestions about how to implement it if it's not being implemented perfectly. You could have that taken care of.

MR. BLUMING: Yes. And the conversation with our client and with counsel would have to take place quickly if that were the Court's decision on it.

But yes. Our position would certainly be beneficial and appointed by the parties.

THE COURT: I agree. I was trying to get organizations which would be viewed as neutral or if there's somebody that both can agree to. I don't know whether there have been people that were connected to the committee that

Judge Sullivan had that have done this kind of work, because I know they have people who came in and looked at the air conditioning system and ventilation and whatever else is going on with it. I don't know whether any of those people would be available or appropriate.

Mr. Marcus?
MR. MARCUS: We agree with your Honor. An expert is important here. And the timing is urgent, and so there's not a ton of time for deliberations.

We have spoken with one potential expert whose name is Dr. Ronald Waldman at George Washington. He has extensive expertise in public health, has worked for the CDC and the WHO, and is available again on an emergency basis. And we think the Court should require a report in hand as soon as possible, within 48 hours or so, we would recommend.

MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, if $I$ may be heard.
THE COURT: We need to do it quickly because we need to figure out how this is working, because it does make a difference in terms of going forward or not going forward or what is involved with it. And I would be inclined to make it a fairly limited thing so we could get a quick report that everybody would be in a position to take a look at.

Mr. Bluming?
MR. BLUMING: If I may be heard on that. We're
obviously happy to move quickly, if you'd like a recommendation from the client in an expeditious manner. One constraint actually is it's 12:00 in a few minutes. There is an oral argument in the Williams case, and so we'll have to proceed to that. I'm trying to stay here. Co-counsel on the phone might move over to that. But immediately following this hearing, this again is if your Honor -- if this is the relief that your Honor is requesting, we'd be happy to talk to our client and get back to the Court as expeditiously as possible. We wouldn't need a lot of time. But we'd just want a moment to be able to propose something before accepting the Plaintiffs' proposed expert.

THE COURT: I would want something that frankly both of you could agree on. And I know Judge Contreras is waiting or -- not waiting, but will be having the next hearing.

The only other question that $I$ had is in -- and this is to the Defendant: In the screening of new people coming in, and I understand -- including staff, that staff is coming in, as $I$ understand it, they are doing daily screenings. In the pleadings, it says the temperature is taken in the material that was on the website. It's not clear that temperatures are being taken of people coming in, including staff. It talked about the questionnaire or
whatever the CDT or some other group has suggested. So I was wondering if you knew whether they actually were taking the temperatures.

MR. BLUMING: This is our understanding, your Honor, and in Dr. Jordan's declaration at 20-2, Paragraph 5. So first, you take the policy as implemented on March 15th that everyone that is entering a new facility is screened for symptoms, using a thermometer and a screening survey, and the following sentences: A nurse takes temperatures and staff members take the written surveys. The staff conduct the screening format in gloves and maintain a written record.

So yes. The record is that that is what's happening for each visitor as they come in, that everyone is screened.

THE COURT: From what you put on the website, it's not clear that you're doing that. The questionnaire is not -- I forgot what -- you don't have them numbered, so I can't tell you where it is. But you should take a look at it, because that was -- when I read it, I was a little surprised they didn't say anything about temperature, because my understanding is you were taking it.

Okay. I've finished with -- let me just look to make sure you've asked all my questions.

Yes.

I think what I'd like to do is, if you could go back, the two I think -- the two issues that have been sort of left out there for you to go back for, Mr. Bluming, is one is the phone issue about the legal access or whatever other suggestion you've got, since it is just a suggestion on my part that this needs to be done rather quickly.

The other question is to have a discussion -- and I think it would help if the two of you, both Plaintiffs and the Defendants, had a conversation about whether there are people that mutually -- either an individual or an organization that you mutually could agree to have somebody go in as an emergency.

It would be limited to -- I'm not looking at legal calls for that person; I'm not looking at the misdemeanants and credits, but just looking strictly at the conditions that have been set out that you've indicated, DOC, that the DOC has indicated they actually do. It's not going to cover everything that Plaintiffs have requested, because you've indicated on some of these you're not doing it. I'm not asking for that.

All I'm asking for is for somebody to go in and resolve the factual issue of whether that has been implemented or has actually been followed through. I'm not suggesting bad faith here. I'm suggesting that in putting it in, it takes time in a large organization to get it done.

And so I want to make sure that it's pointed out if things are not working as they should, that you get -- that you make sure that you actually are doing it. Okay?

MR. BLUMING: Understood, your Honor. We're happy to confer with our client and with Plaintiffs' counsel.

THE COURT: So what I'd like is, I think I'd like a telephone call at the end of the day. I'm trying to think what is the best way to communicate. Hopefully, it would be nice if you could agree on somebody. It would make my job easier. And I do think conversations with each other would be helpful.

And I might not immediately, but along the way here, I might very well set up a small working group to have a discussion of trying to resolve some of these issues by having discussions about suggestions on how to do it or not having it all done. We could do the litigation on a track. I'm not suggesting that you not do that. So perhaps have discussions about some practical issues about how things can get done. But I'll get back to you about that.

But the phones and the issue of the two sides on somebody who -- and the other question is if the person wants to be compensated, how that is taken care of. That's always an issue.

So what is the best way to communicate back to me? Do you want to have a phone call? Do you want to --
probably it would be -- I think it would be best to do a phone call instead of fooling around trying to file notices and stuff. So does that work?

I have a 4:30 judges' meeting.

Mr. Bluming, you've got to get over there. But do you think you'd know by 4:00? Is that too soon?

MR. BLUMING: I think that's appropriate, your
Honor.

MR. MARCUS: Your Honor, we --

THE COURT: You can tell me where you are at that point.

MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, we could definitely update the Court at 4:00. And again, we're not sure how long Judge Contreras's hearing will go. And we won't be able to have either the contemplated discussion until that hearing is over.

And --
THE COURT: As I understand it, you've got some -Eric Glover has been providing a lot of information to the -- we've been getting daily reports. And there's a whole series of other individuals that perhaps they could start it.

I take it you're expected to be in Judge Contreras's -- the next conference, is that correct, or video?

MR. BLUMING: Your Honor, the next hearing is totally telephonic. I'm not the one arguing. My colleague is arguing. But I was going to be present where -- I think the same arrangement, where she could identify the people and ask questions.

THE COURT: No problem.
But you do have other people. Maybe one of those could start the process of talking. I mean, you all must have had different experts or different people that have done inspections over the years that could be contacted. As I said, I know that Judge Sullivan's committee did have people do some inspections about the air conditioning and ventilation.

Now, that's obviously a different issue than what we're talking about here. But it may be that some of these people would be appropriate. I'll leave it to you.

Okay. I will host it at 4:00. Hopefully, it'll be short, since I have to then be on the other phone for our executive session with the Court.

I did not ask, but let me just ask now, are there any Plaintiffs' attorneys on the phone that want to add anything?

I don't hear anything, so I'm assuming no.
Is there any attorney on the Defendants' side that's on the phone that wishes to add anything?

All right. I hear silence.
I'm assuming that we're done. I thank you all. I appreciate the time that you've taken to give me the pleadings and declarations. Both sides have been able to get this together. And hopefully, we can move on this and make sure that what's happening in the community does not happen at DOC.

All right. Take care. Be well.
MR. BLUMING: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, Judge.
MR. MARCUS: Thank you, your Honor.
(Proceeding concluded.)

## CERTIFICATE

I, LISA EDWARDS, RDR, CRR, do hereby certify that the foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes, and is a full, true, and complete transcript of the proceedings produced to the best of my ability.

Dated this 7th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Lisa Edwards, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 333 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room 6706 Washington, DC 20001 (202) 354-3269




| ```55:25, 56:23, 56:24, 57:1, 57:3, 66:5, 66:8 Court's [3] - 17:8, 51:12, 67:19 courtroom [3] - 20:4, 20:7, 20:11 courtrooms [1] - 57:1 courts [3]-21:7, 24:2, 58:21 Courts [2] - 33:17, 52:24 cover [3] - 26:16, 58:21, 71:17 COVID-19 [6] - 6:11, 7:11, 34:10, 34:15, 40:6, 45:4 created [1] - 12:2 credit [2]-34:18, 65:11 crediting [1] - 66:15 credits [5]-18:2, 21:17, 29:13, 35:10, 71:15 crisis [1] - 33:8 cross [1] - 12:9 cross-examining [1] - 12:9 CRR [3] - 2:7, 76:3, 76:12 cruel \({ }_{[2]}\) - 51:14, 52:11 CSOSA [7] - 30:7, 31:7, 31:8, 31:14, 31:22, 32:17, 35:16 CTF [1]-22:20 cubicles [2]-53:25, 54:2 current [4]-26:15, 33:8, 34:21, 35:2 custody [4]-34:16, 38:8, 38:23, \(39: 1\) cut \([4]-12: 24,22: 8\), 48:19, 48:22 cutting [1] - 58:14``` <br> D ```daily [2] - 69:21, 73:20 damages [2] - 9:6, 10:1 danger [6] - 18:11, 19:18, 19:24, 22:14, 29:3, 33:2 dangerousness [1] - 28:11 data [1] - 59:10 date [2]-5:8, 5:19``` | ```Dated [1] - 76:10 days[2]-12:3, 18:15 DC [32] - 1:6, 1:17, 1:22, 2:5, 2:10, 4:17, 7:10, 9:1, 9:2, 17:7, 20:8, 23:16, 24:1, 24:23, 30:8, 34:9, 34:21, 34:25, 35:2, 35:10, 51:3, 51:18, 51:22, 59:7, 59:19, 60:2, 60:11, 60:16, 60:17, 61:5, 76:14 deal [2] - 3:12, 10:6 dealing[3]-8:9, 20:14, 41:18 deals [1]-23:21 dealt [1] - 66:9 death [3]-26:18, 33:18, 46:12 decent [1] - 29:5 decide [1] - 17:20 decision [4]-9:18, 22:3, 51:12, 67:19 decisions [1] - 18:19 declarants [2] - 42:4, 62:23 declaration [19] - 6:2, 6:3, 10:14, 10:25, 11:3, 14:17, 14:20, 16:10, 16:14, 16:24, 17:3, 37:13, 43:2, 43:3, 44:16, 44:22, 61:15, 62:2, 70:5 declarations [12] - 12:3, 42:9, 42:23, 43:1, 61:14, 61:17, 61:18, 61:22, 62:3, 62:13, 65:18, 75:4 declared [1] - 43:10 declined [1] - 22:19 decreasing[1] - 49:3 defendant [2] - 20:12, 57:2 Defendant[3]-50:1, 50:8, 69:19 Defendant's [1] - 9:7 defendants [7] - 17:18, 18:7, 21:11, 21:15, 21:19, 23:17, 28:20 Defendants [22] - 1:7, 4:22, 5:1, 6:1, 6:11, 6:20, 6:23, 8:2, 8:4, 9:12, 9:19, 14:9, 15:1, 15:3, 16:9, 39:24, 42:8, 45:3, 45:16, 59:2, 65:19, 71:9 DEFENDANTS [1] - 2:2``` | ```Defendants' [4] - 4:7, 9:23, 65:12, 74:24 defendants' [1] - 21:23 DEFENDER [1] - 1:20 Defender [4] - 18:22, 20:22, 23:2, 23:10 defense [2]-3:5, 8:21 deference [1]-23:21 definitely [1]-73:12 degree [1] - 9:6 deliberate [20]-5:7, 5:17, 6:23, 7:3, 8:18, 9:25, 10:11, 11:13, 11:14, 13:19, 41:19, 50:25, 51:9, 51:16, 51:17, 52:14, 53:2, 53:4, 53:18 deliberately [1] - 9:11 deliberations [1] - 68:9 delivered [1] - 6:17 demands [1] - 32:16 demonstrates [1] - 9:12 Department [31] - 5:2, 5:5, 5:16, 6:3, 6:15, 7:11, 7:18, 10:9, 10:12, 11:5, 12:13, 14:12, 14:19, 17:24, 22:17, 24:3, 24:4, 24:6, 25:4, 27:6, 30:9, 30:16, 30:17, 34:7, 34:18, 35:8, 36:9, 40:13, 61:21, 62:5, 62:13 department [1] - 43:8 designated [1] - 20:22 despite [3] - 11:4, 11:8, 13:22 detail [1] - 44:3 details [2]-8:12, 17:2 detainee [2]-51:13, 51:20 detainees [4] - 50:3, 50:7, 50:18, 52:24 Detention[1]-66:6 detention [2]-3:16, 19:17 determine [1] - 33:7 determined [1] - 35:22 determining [5] -``` | ```29:18, 30:25, 37:15, 38:13, 51:12 developed [8] - 13:13, 15:15, 15:17, 30:7, 30:8, 31:15, 37:8, 37:10 developing [1] - 31:7 diabetes [3]-26:16, 27:12, 33:12 difference [2] - 19:7, 68:19 differences [1] - 64:13 different [16] - 7:12, 12:9, 15:5, 16:7, 24:22, 45:13, 47:24, 49:15, 50:3, 50:10, 52:8, 52:21, 65:6, 74:9, 74:14 differently [1] - 52:12 differing[1] - 62:12 Dillard [1] - 8:20 direct [1] - 3:4 directed [5] - 14:8, 39:24, 47:25, 50:1, 65:24 directly [2] - 20:3, 45:5 director [1] - 14:19 disagree [2] - 59:15, 65:13 disconnect [1] - 65:2 discontinuing [1] - 60:9 discovery [1] - 25:1 discretion[3]-31:2, 35:10, 35:12 discuss[5]-4:13, 10:24, 22:10, 61:17, 67:3 discussed [3] - 15:12, 36:2, 59:22 discusses [1] - 60:3 discussing[2] - 63:6,63:7 discussion [14] - 4:3, 4:15, 7:2, 32:22, 54:9, 54:16, 55:10, 55:23, 56:4, 56:7, 58:8, 71:7, 72:14, 73:15 discussions [5] - 23:6, 35:21, 54:20, 72:15, 72:18 disease [1] - 48:16 diseases [2] - 14:22, 48:24 DISNEY [1]-2:3 displaying[1] -``` | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 13:24 } \\ & \text { dispute }[4]-5: 10, \\ & \text { 12:13, 16:6, } 65: 8 \\ & \text { distancing }[7]- \\ & 35: 23,40: 1,40: 16, \\ & 41: 22,42: 3,46: 10, \\ & \text { 48:6 } \\ & \text { distinction }[4]-5: 13, \\ & 60: 18,61: 6,64: 5 \\ & \text { District }[6]-2: 8,2: 8, \\ & 24: 25,43: 6,60: 4, \\ & 76: 13 \\ & \text { district }[1]-76: 13 \\ & \text { DISTRICT }[6]-1: 1, \\ & 1: 1,1: 11,1: 16,1: 21, \\ & 2: 4 \\ & \text { Division }[1]-24: 17 \\ & \text { division }[1]-22: 7 \\ & \text { DOC }[18]-10: 23, \\ & 15: 12,29: 19,34: 15, \\ & 36: 13,36: 16,36: 19, \\ & 36: 21,40: 25,41: 17, \\ & 41: 23,43: 12,57: 22, \\ & 64: 22,65: 3,71: 16, \\ & 71: 17,75: 7 \\ & \text { DOC's }[3]-14: 10, \\ & 35: 5,38: 4 \\ & \text { Docket }[1]-6: 13 \\ & \text { docket }[1]-34: 5 \\ & \text { doctor }[1]-13: 22 \\ & \text { document }[2]-7: 15, \\ & 40: 17 \\ & \text { domestic }[4]-18: 13, \\ & 19: 14,22: 6,22: 7 \\ & \text { done }[31]-5: 19, \\ & 12: 4,12: 21,13: 7, \\ & 15: 4,19: 10,22: 5, \\ & 28: 18,29: 5,33: 16, \\ & 42: 12,44: 9,48: 18, \\ & 56: 22,58: 11,61: 3, \\ & 61: 19,63: 11,63: 24, \\ & 64: 18,64: 21,64: 22, \\ & 66: 13,68: 1,71: 6, \\ & 71: 25,72: 16,72: 19, \\ & 74: 10,75: 2 \\ & \text { doubt }[1]-24: 7 \\ & \text { down }[10]-19: 22, \\ & 22: 9,29: 6,35: 22, \\ & 37: 7,41: 9,48: 19, \\ & 48: 22,51: 17,59: 20 \\ & \text { downsizing }[5]- \\ & 30: 4,30: 14,37: 16, \\ & 37: 19,49: 1 \\ & \text { Dr }[19]-6: 7,14: 19, \\ & 14: 23,15: 9,15: 11, \\ & 15: 13,15: 14,15: 19, \\ & 15: 22,15: 23,16: 13, \\ & 16: 19,16: 20,37: 12, \\ & 42: 10,43: 3,61: 23, \\ & 68: 11,70: 5 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |






| 14:20, 15:9, 16:18, | 57:1 | 65:17, 69:12, 72:5, | post-Kingsley ${ }^{[1]}$ - | 22:25, 51:11 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 43:10, } 70: 5 \\ & \text { paragraphs [1] }- \end{aligned}$ | PERLOFF ${ }_{[1]}$ - 1:14 permanent [2] - | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 74:21 } \\ & \text { Plata [3] - 9:18 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 52:18 } \\ & \text { post-sentence } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { prison [8] - 8:22, } \\ 9: 20,30: 10,30: 12, \end{gathered}$ |
| 37:14 parole [2] - 22:18, | $\begin{gathered} \text { 67:10, } 67: 11 \\ \text { permitting } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 11:17, } 48: 25 \\ \text { play }[1]-9: 5 \end{gathered}$ | $50: 13$ <br> post-trial [3]-5:14, | $\begin{aligned} & 38: 9,48: 18,48: 22 \text {, } \\ & 49: 4 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 26:8 } \\ & \text { part }[9]-3: 22,4: 15, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 23:17 } \\ & \text { person [10] - 3:24, } \end{aligned}$ | plea [1]-56:7 <br> pleading [2]-5:1, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 26:5, 50:14 } \\ & \text { potential }[2]-19: 24, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Prison [3] - 11:23, } \\ & \text { 13:10, 38:6 } \end{aligned}$ |
| $23: 1,36: 18,43: 19$ <br> 46:8, 49:16, 53:22 | 14:24, 20:22, 33:3, | $54: 8$ | 68:10 | prisoner [1] - 30:8 <br> prisons [1] - 49:4 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 46: 8,49: 16,53: 22, \\ & 71: 6 \\ & \text { participating }[1] \text { - } \end{aligned}$ | 65:16, 71:14, 72:21 person's [1] - 3:23 | pleadings [4]-4:2, <br> 4:7, 69:22, 75:4 <br> pleas [1]-56:5 | potentially [2] - 4:12, 67:7 power [2]-34:8, | prisons [1]-49:4 <br> Prisons [1] - 27:10 privy [2]-23:8, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 41:2 } \\ & \text { particular }[14]-16: ~ \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { personal [14] - } 6: 6, \\ 6: 8,6: 25,7: 24,11: 3, \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { point [26] - 4:18, } \\ 4: 20,9: 17,11: 24, \end{gathered}$ | 34:10 Powers [1] - 51:3 | 24:18 |
| 18:11, 18:17, 22:2, | 15:20, 42:17, 43:5, | 13:4, 13:19, 14:18 | vers-Bunce [1] | bable [1] - 19:17 |
| 27:3, 28:24, 38:16, | 43:14, 43:18, 43:22 | 14:23, 25:22, 26:3 | 51: | bation [2] |
| $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline 40: 24,44: 16,44: 21 \\ 46: 3,48: 23,51: 19 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { 44:17, 44:20, } 44: 22 \\ \text { personally }[1] \text { - } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 26: 13,27: 23,28: 4, \\ & 28: 17,38: 2,41: 13, \end{aligned}$ | PPE [2] - 5:4, 10:13 <br> practical [3]-26:25, | $31: 23,32: 24$ <br> probationa |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 60:23 } \\ & \text { particularly [2] - } \end{aligned}$ | 43:21 <br> perspective [3] | 41:21, 47:10, 51:11, 53:15, 53:23, 60:3, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 55:20, } 72: 18 \\ & \text { practice }[2]-41: 22, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 22:11 } \\ & \text { problem }[6]-15: 23 \text {, } \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & 9: 25,28: 21 \\ & \text { parties }[3]-38: 6, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 23:13, 46:14, } 62: 11 \\ \text { persuasive }[1]-9: 5 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 60: 17,63: 7,66: 15 \\ & 73: 11 \end{aligned}$ | 42:3 | $\begin{aligned} & 32: 16,34: 14,47: 14, \\ & 57: 6,74: 6 \end{aligned}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 67:2, 67:21 } \\ & \text { passed [2] - 43:20, } \end{aligned}$ | pertains [1] - 50:18 <br> pervasive ${ }_{[1]}$ - 47:21 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { pointed }[2]-13: 5, \\ & 72: 1 \end{aligned}$ | pre-COVID-19 [1] - $41: 7$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { problems [2] - 27:5, } \\ & \text { 27:20 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 51:16 | phone ${ }_{[20]}$-15:11, | points [4]-4:1, 5:23, | precaution [1] | procedures [8] - |
| PDS ${ }_{[2]}-22: 19,66: 8$ <br> pending [1]-3:18 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 16:16, 16:20, 20:11, } \\ & \text { 23:11, 42:24, 55:5, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:5, 25:17 } \\ & \text { police }[2]-19: 13 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 53:16 } \\ & \text { precisely }[2]-13: 12, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9: 13,9: 16,15: 18, \\ & 38: 10,61: 24,63: 1 \end{aligned}$ |
| people [71]-8:9, | 55:6, 57:8, 57:14, | 43:6 | 42: | 63:17, 64:2 |
| 10:9, 13:23, 13:25, | 57:17, 57:24, 58:12, | policies [11] - 9:12 | preclude [5] - | proceed [1] - 69:5 |
| 14:6, 19:22, 25:20, | 69:6, 71:4, 72:25, | 9:15, 11:6, 14:11, | 5:17, 8:17, 9:8, 25:5 | Proceeding [1] - |
| 26:3, 26:12, 26:17, | 73:2, 74:18, 74:21, | 15:15, 15:17, 15:21, | precludes [1] - 10:11 | 75:12 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 26: 23,27: 4,27: 8, \\ & 27: 9,29: 20,30: 20 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline 74: 25 \\ \text { phon } \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 42: 11,43: 25,57: 22, \\ & 58: 13 \end{aligned}$ | predominantly [3] - | proceeding $[2]-3: 4$, |
| 30:21, 31:16, 31:18, | $54: 4,54: 12,54: 13$ | policy [5] - 10:25 | preexisting ${ }_{2}$ | proceedings [1] - |
| 31:20, 32:20, 33:7, | 55:4, 56:9, 56:11, | 40:3, 41:10, 43:16 | 26:23, 33:12 | 76:6 |
| 33:10, 33:14, 34:22 | 57:7, 58:5, 72:20 | 70: | preliminary [1] - 4:6 | process [13] - 12:8, |
| $34: 23,34: 24,35: 1$, $35: 3,35: 5,36: 14$, | $\mathrm{Pl}_{[1]}$ - 67:7 | [1] - 8:2 | present [5] - 13:8, | $17: 8,18: 1,22: 24,$ |
| 35:3, 35:5, 36:14, $36: 16,36: 19,36: 23$ | ce [1] - 57:2 | pulation [11] | 18:12, 27:15, 44:13 | $24: 16,25: 12,25: 1$ |
| 37:18, 37:23, 41:6, | $32: 12,40: 15,43: 25,$ | $34: 9,35: 2,35: 22$ | presented [1]-20:24 | $28: 5,31: 5,74: 8$ |
| 41:7, 41:9, 41:18, | 57:24, 64:23, 65:23, | 36:22, 37:7, 39:17 | resenting ${ }_{[1]}$ - 4:17 | procure [1] - 10:23 |
| 42:2, 43:20, 45:24, | 67:18 | 46:10, 48:5 | presumably [3] - | procuring [1] - 12:9 |
| 47:8, 48:22, 48:23, $49: 5,50: 5,52: 2,52: 4$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Plaintiff [4]-11:17, } \\ 38: 23,62: 1,62: 7 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { pose }[2]-22: 14 \\ & 50: 22 \end{aligned}$ | $26: 4,35: 15,42: 12$ | produced [1] - 76:6 |
| $52: 7,53: 5,56: 5,$ | Plaintiffs [28] - 1:4, | posed [1] - 10:8 | presume ${ }_{[1]}-31: 15$ <br> presumed ${ }_{[1]}$ - 52:3 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { professional [2] - } \\ & 15: 2,15: 6 \end{aligned}$ |
| 58:22, 64:16, 65:3, | 4:21, 5:1, 5:15, 5:20, | posing [1] - 53:13 | pretrial [17]-5:13, | program [1] - 32:5 |
| 66:3, 66:9, 66:11, | 5:22, 12:12, 16:9, | positing [1] - 56:17 | $26: 5,32: 7,32: 24,$ | programs [4] - |
| 67:25, 68:2, 68:4, 69:19, 69:24, 71:10, | 17:7, 17:9, $23: 15$, $29: 11,33 \cdot 24,38 \cdot 21$, | ition [5] - 45:17, | 50:3, 50:6, 50:12, | 28:24, 32:4, 32:6 |
| 74:4, 74:7, 74:9, | 38:22, 39:16, 39:18, | 45:18, 45:24, 67:20, 68:22 | 3, 52:3, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { progress [2]-21:18, } \\ & 21: 23 \end{aligned}$ |
| 74:12, 74:16 | 39:20, 39:22, 42:15, | positive [3]-3:16, | $\begin{aligned} & 52: 4,52: 12,52: 21, \\ & 52: 24,53: 12,53: 19 \end{aligned}$ | prohibit [1] - 13:10 |
| Peralta [1]-8:20 percentage [2] - | $\begin{aligned} & 45: 2,45: 6,50: 2,59: 3, \\ & 59: 16,65: 5,71: 8, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 8:12, } 8: 13 \\ & \text { possibility }[1]-46: 7 \end{aligned}$ | $56: 1$ $\text { Pretrial }{ }_{[1]}-28: 23$ | prohibitory [3] - <br> 59:18, 60:18, 61:6 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 29:22, 30:11 } \\ & \text { perfectly }[2]-64: 4, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 71: 18 \\ \text { PLAINTIFFS } \\ {[1]} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { possible [4] - 22:25, } \\ 23: 4,68: 15,69: 10 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Pretrial }[1]-28: 23 \\ & \text { pretty }[2]-16: 25, \\ & 47: 5 \end{aligned}$ | promote [1] - 39:25 <br> prong [2] - 52:13, |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 67:15 } \\ & \text { perform }[1]-8: 12 \\ & \text { perhaps }[5]-13: 14, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1:14 } \\ & \text { Plaintiffs' }[18]-3: 5 \text {, } \\ & 4: 4,4: 8,7: 6,7: 16, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { possibly }[1]-64: 6 \\ \text { post }[8]-5: 14,26: 5 \text {, } \\ 50: 13,50: 14,52: 7 \text {, } \end{gathered}$ | prevent [5]-13:12, 17:9, 23:18, 29:22, $40 \cdot 22$ | 61:2 <br> properly [2]-24:2, <br> 48:21 |
| 63:8, 63:23, 72:17, | 11:4, 15:7, 29:24, | $52: 18,52: 21,53: 5$ | 40:22 <br> previously [2] - 40:5, | 48:21 <br> proposal [3]-31:21, |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 73: 21 \\ \text { period }[2]-50: 11, \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 35: 3,45: 7,45: 8 \\ & 51: 10,61: 15,65: 12 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { post-conviction }[3] \text { - } \\ & 52: 7,52: 21,53: 5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 41:4 } \\ & \text { principal }[3]-22: 23, \end{aligned}$ | $35: 3,58: 8$ propose [1] - 69:12 |






